

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEMASTER MOBILIZATION PLANI. INTRODUCTION

This DoD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP) is promulgated under the authority of DoD Directive S-3020.36, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities to Department of Defense Components (U)," August 28, 1973, as the basic plan to direct and coordinate planning by all Agencies of the Department of Defense (DoD) for the contingency of mobilization, as defined herein.

Mobilization is the process whereby a nation makes the transition from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to a war-fighting posture. It involves the assembly, organization, and application of the nation's resources for national defense. The mobilization process encompasses all activities necessary to prepare systematically and selectively for war. The ability to mobilize effectively contributes to the deterrence of war.

The complexity and magnitude of the mobilization process mean that sound planning is essential for success, particularly if mobilization must be done hastily. The fundamental purpose of this mobilization plan is to provide the framework for making mobilization decisions and managing the mobilization process to support military operations. This framework also provides an overall perspective on the decision making process for key decision makers and their supporting staffs. This plan and its supporting plans address peacetime planning, but the emphasis is on tasks to be done during mobilization.

This MMP is the first level of mobilization planning. The MMP identifies mobilization responsibilities and describes the related tasks to be performed both in peacetime in preparation for a crisis and at the time of mobilization. Simply stated, the MMP describes what is to be done and who is to do it. It also delineates the functional relationships among the DoD Components for each responsibility that overlaps two or more Agencies. How the various tasks are to be carried out is contained in subsequent levels of planning. This basic document is not all-inclusive, but rather forms the nucleus upon which more detailed plans can be generated.

At the second level of planning, each organizational element assigned responsibilities in this master plan develops its own supporting plans. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will develop their own mobilization plans that are consistent with and support the responsibilities and tasks in this Plan. These are Level II plans. These Level II plans and supporting material will describe the task, identify related tasks, identify other affected organizations, specify the decision maker or management committee in charge of the activity, describe effects of related decisions and activities, and describe the procedures and/or coordination required to execute the task. Each plan should include pre-positioned documents and actions to be executed in a contingency situation. These Level II task plans may range from single page to multiple page documents. The Level II plans for OSD staff elements may be contingency independent, whereas certain Defense Agencies' and the Services' planning might include some contingency specific considerations.

In addition to Level 11 plans, Emergency Action Packages (EAPs) will be created. Each EAP contains specific instructions on how mobilization decisions are to be effected across these organizational lines. EAPs will ensure consistent mobilization planning across organizational lines. The EAPs will be updated periodically as determined by the proponent Agency, and will be tested for completeness and effectiveness in appropriate exercises. EAPs that require SECDEF approval must include implementers.. If SECDEF approval is not required, the EAP itself must be implemented and provide evidence that an action has occurred.

Supporting plans deal primarily with specific contingencies. The Military Departments and supporting Defense Agencies will continue to develop mobilization plans to support operation plans, as directed in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and in accordance with the Defense Guidance (DG).

The repetitive nature of the mobilization planning process provides important feedback from the second and third planning levels to this master Plan. In a similar way, coordination of this Plan with other Federal Agencies will improve later revisions of this Plan. This revision of the MMP is not complete, but will evolve, through successive revisions, into a more complete plan with detailed guidance, better tasking, and more options. As organizations develop their mobilization plans, new interfaces may be identified and tasks added, deleted, or transferred to other offices. The feedback from the contingency specific Plans impacts on both the master Plan and the plans of the individual organizations, with both sets of plans improving in quality of coverage as the planning process evolves over successive revisions.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel (ASD(FM&P)) is responsible for this Plan.

## II. MOBILIZATION POLICY AND AUTHORITIES

Mobilization is the process of preparing for war or other emergencies by assembling, organizing, and using manpower, material, and resources. Our mobilization process can enhance our warfighting and, thereby, help deter war. Therefore, mobilization plans must include a range of phased, incremental improvements in force readiness, deployment capabilities and sustainability that may be taken prior to, or during, a war. This process must encompass all activities necessary to mobilize gradually, or rapidly from partial through total mobilization.

National mobilization policies and objectives are established by the President and the National Security Council. The Congress exercises de facto control of the national mobilization process through the congressional roles in budget approval and fund authorization. Mobilization planning and preparedness is a key responsibility within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Broad, basic mobilization policies, objectives, and planning guidance for the Department are set forth in the Defense Guidance, and are translated into programs by the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)) is responsible for promulgating mobilization policy guidance for the defense community; ASD(FM&P) is responsible for developing and coordinating among DoD Components all mobilization plans and their execution in consonance with the guidance established by USD(P).

### LEGAL AUTHORITIES

Mobilization planning must provide a range of options for implementation prior to a declaration of war or national emergency, as well as after, and must ensure legal authority will exist for any option. There are many emergency authorities that authorize federal officials to take certain actions during times of war, national emergency, or other circumstances deemed sufficiently critical to warrant the exercise of such extraordinary authority. Emergency authority is based on U.S. Code and Public Law, or upon Executive Orders (E.O.s), Federal regulations, departmental regulations, and interagency agreements that may implement or be derived from U.S. Code and Public Law.

Existing legal authorities for mobilization actions can be categorized as being available in peacetime, available when the security of the Nation is at grave risk, or available after a Presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency. Standby legal authorities should be prepared and maintained as on-the-shelf legislation, during peacetime, for enactment as needed during a period of rising tensions, national emergency, or war. Additionally, actions required to obtain additional authorities are significant parts of many EAPs.

Some statutes permit actions that do not require a declaration of national emergency or a wartime situation (Appendix B, Attachment 2, B-2-1). These may be invoked by the President, or in some cases a department head, and are available in peacetime as well as in a period of rising tension. Examples of such authorities are: the President's ability to order to active duty up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for up to 90 days, plus an additional 90 days when it is considered in the best interest of national security,

without a declaration of national emergency; the president's option during periods of involuntary recall of Reserve component personnel to suspend any provision of law pertaining to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the Armed Forces (Stop-Loss); the Military Department Secretary's authority to recall regular and reserve retired members with more than 20 years active service; extending the jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Administration; requiring priority performance on contracts; and guaranteeing loans to defense contractors.

A national emergency can be declared by the President, the Congress, or both. Prior to 1976, the declaration of a national emergency was a major event, a decisive turning point, before which no preparatory actions were taken and after which everything possible to prepare for war was done. However, since the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) was passed in 1976, the declaration of a national emergency is no longer an all-or-nothing situation. The Act provides that when the president declares a national emergency, he must specify in the declaration or subsequent executive orders the specific authorities he is invoking; his powers are limited to those invoked until he subsequently announces he is invoking additional specified authorities (Appendix B, Attachment 2, B-2-3). Thus, a set of national emergency powers must be constructed to meet the needs of a Presidentially-declared emergency. Congress may terminate the President's declaration of a national emergency at any time by concurrent resolution and will review the declaration and situation every 6 months.

This means that, while declaring a national emergency remains an important decision, the United States can now temporize and send small, incremental signals that may help deescalate a crisis or allow us to take certain necessary actions with a minimum of provocation. For instance, after the hostage-taking in Iran, the President declared a national emergency for the sole purpose of freezing Iranian assets in this country.

Since the President specifies authorities used in declaring a national emergency, it is more efficient for the president to cite all those authorities that will be needed in the immediately foreseeable future at the time the emergency is initially declared. Accordingly, DoD advisors to the President should routinely consider the entire range of authorities available under a Presidentially-declared emergency and prepare to make timely recommendations whenever it becomes necessary for the president to declare a national emergency (See Section IV and Appendix B). In that way, a piecemeal approach to Presidential authorities can be avoided and time can be saved. The Department of Defense should consult with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in formulating a recommendation for a declaration of a national emergency.

Previously enacted standby legislation require a Congressionally-declared national emergency before becoming effective in time of emergency (Appendix B, Attachment 2, B-2-5). For example, mobilization of the Standby Reserve and recall of military retirees who have completed less than 20 years of active duty service must be preceded by the declaration of a national emergency or war by the Congress. As contrasted with a Presidentially-declared national emergency, it is not mandated by law that a congressional declaration specify which authorities will be invoked or for what purposes it has been declared. DoD

mobilization planners, however, should develop the package of authorities needed under a congressionally-declared emergency, since in some cases, even with a congressional declaration, the President must still invoke selected authorities separately.

Considerations for seeking a declaration of national emergency are included in Section IV to this plan. Appendix B is a staff reference which provides a summary and analysis of emergency authorities available in the Department of Defense. The DoD Emergency Authorities Retrieval and Analysis System (DEARAS) is a distributed data base portable system for the research of the full text of DoD emergency mobilization legal authorities. Development and maintenance of the system, including the annual review and update of its data base are accomplished by the Air Force Directorate of Legal Information Services (USAF/JAS) for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, under the authority of DoD Directive 3020.36. While no system of extracting and compiling legal authorities governing emergency powers of the Department of Defense can be regarded as complete, DEARAS incorporates many authorities listed in this MMP, plus such additional authorities as are recommended by DoD agencies in annual reviews of its data base.

All DoD organizations have a need and responsibility to plan for flexible funding during emergency situations. Some methods of maintaining funding include:

1. Reprogramming - Provides flexibility to revise programs within an appropriation that departs from the purpose originally budgeted for, and justified to, the Congress in support of funding authorizations and budget requests.
2. Transfer Authority - Annual DoD Authorization and Appropriation Acts provide general authority (within a fiscal limitation) for transfers between appropriations based on unforeseen military requirements determined to be of higher priority than those initially authorized and appropriated.
3. Section 3732 Deficiency Authority - Permits the Department of Defense to enter into obligations on a deficiency basis to cover necessities of the current year under circumstances in which appropriations for clothing, subsistence, storage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical supplies are exhausted.
4. Emergency Military Construction Authority - 10 U.S.C. 2803 provides each of the Military Departments and the Combined Defense Agencies with authority of \$30 million for construction of facilities considered vital to the national security.
5. Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency - 10 U.S.C. 2808 provides further construction authority in the event of war or Presidential declaration of a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq) requiring use of the Armed Forces. Under this provision, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law, may undertake military construction projects and authorize the Secretaries of the Military Departments to do the same. These

projects need not be otherwise authorized by law but must be necessary to support such use of the Armed Forces. Such projects may be undertaken only within the amount of unobligated balances of appropriations currently available for military construction and family housing.

6. Military Construction Contingency Authority and Funds - 10 U.S.C. 2804 and the annual Military Construction Appropriation Acts contain limited authority for funds transfer from the Defense Agency Military Construction account. The Secretary of Defense may designate use of these funds for Military Construction projects essential to national interest or national security.

### III. MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Every DoD organization and staff element has responsibilities in the mobilization planning and execution processes. This section lists broad statements of responsibilities for the mobilization planning and execution processes for the DoD Components. (Detailed statements of tasks associated with these responsibilities are contained in Appendix C).

#### GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Establish within each office and Agency an organization with responsibility to identify, review, and focus on mobilization issues within the organization's functional areas of responsibility for partial, full, and total mobilization.
2. Develop and maintain supporting mobilization plans and documents.
3. Determine organizational responsibilities, manning levels and space requirements necessary to execute mobilization responsibilities.
4. Coordinate mobilization plans with OSD staff elements, OJCS, Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other Federal Agencies, as appropriate.
5. Identify information requirements for mobilization planning, decision making, execution, and for developing supporting plans for gathering that information in a time of crisis.
6. Establish procedures, design current and standby legislation packages, and create emergency authorization documents to simplify execution of mobilization decisions.
7. Evaluate the adequacy of plans and programs to carry out a rapid, efficient mobilization process.
8. Develop Emergency Action Packages (EAPs) that will allow rapid response to crisis conditions.

IV. MOBILIZATION DECISIONSA. Introduction

The mobilization decisions discussed in this section may be made by the Secretary of Defense, the President, or Congress. Decisions that can be made by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies or below the Under and/or Assistant Secretaries of Defense level are generally not included in the MMP. These lesser levels of decision should be included in Level II plans. Some of the decisions can be carried out under the existing peacetime authority of the Secretary of Defense; others require the declaration of a national emergency. The following list of mobilization decisions is not exhaustive.

B. Declaration of National Emergency

A declaration of national emergency by the President or the Congress automatically triggers the availability of a range of emergency authorities. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) stipulates that, under a Presidential declaration, all authorities that are to be used be formally specified at the time of declaration or following the declaration (see draft Executive Order, Appendix B, Attachment 1, B-1-1 - B-1-5). Appendix B, Attachment 2 (B-2-1 - B-2-6) is a partial list of emergency authorities. Attachment 2 has four parts: powers that "do not require a formal declaration of national emergency; powers under a Presidential Declaration; powers under a congressional declaration that are not available under a Presidential declaration; and other powers essential to the mobilization effort.

Prior to a warning that might lead to a declaration of national emergency, DoD elements have a general responsibility to be prepared for the consequences of a declaration.

1. Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the heads of DoD Agencies must be ready to use or obtain the legal authorities necessary for emergency operations, including:

a. Emergency Action Packages (EAPs) of coordinated drafts of additional legal powers (or requests for relief from legal constraints) needed to operate under emergency conditions.

b. Periodic reviews of the Declaration of National Emergency (Appendix B, Attachment 1) to ensure that the Declaration includes those authorities essential to Agency operations.

c. Training of personnel about emergency legal powers.

2. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) has the overall responsibility for guiding and coordinating the development of EAPs. USD(P) also maintains a central file of all completed EAPs.

3. Both the DoD General Counsel (GC) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ASD(LA)) support the development of EAPs, upon request.



During a period of warning that might escalate to a declaration of national emergency, Defense elements have a general responsibility to review their legal posture for mobilization, along with the tentative list of authorities to be included in the Declaration of National Emergency (Appendix B, Attachment 1). Specific element requirements include:

1. General Counsel (GC) will support Agency reviews and proposals for emergency legal authorities.

2. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ASD(LA)) supports agency requests for advice on potential legislative action.

3. Director for Emergency Planning or Director, Crisis Control Group, when activated) coordinates actions taken by the Department of Defense to enhance emergency powers.

When a threat to national Interests appears imminent, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) will review the current draft Declaration of National Emergency (Appendix B, Attachment 1). The DUSD(P) will request recommendations for additions to the draft Declaration from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Secretaries and all DoD Agencies. Other actions required include:

1. CJCS, Service Secretaries, and Agency heads will review the draft Declaration, pertinent authorities, EAPs and any new requirements. They will submit recommendations to the DUSDS(P), with copies to General Counsel.

2. Director for Emergency Planning (ODUSD(P)) or Director, Crisis Control Group (when activated) will coordinate Agency input.

3. General Counsel screens and reviews all recommended input, coordinates the proposed requests with Department of Justice and FEMA General Counsel (if required), and prepares the final request for declaration.

4. After review, Secretary of Defense will submit a request for a Declaration of National Emergency to the President.

5. Director for Emergency Planning or Director, Crisis Control Group (when activated) will distribute copies of a signed Declaration of National Emergency (to CJCS, Service Secretaries, and DoD Agency heads).

6. Director for Emergency Planning or Director, Crisis Control Group (when activated) will ensure that essential changes in emergency authorities are sent to the President or Congress for action and that all Agencies are informed of changes.

c. Program Budget Changes

The decisions regarding emergency funding requirements are dependent on the crisis scenario. The following list highlights the major programing and/or budgeting decisions that would be considered. Table 1 on page C-47 provides a more comprehensive listing.

1. Budget Supplemental - Provides the President with the means to request from the Congress additional funding above approved authorization and appropriation levels to meet urgent requirements.

2. Reprogramming - Provides flexibility to revise programs within an appropriation which departs from the purpose originally budgeted for and justified to the Congress in support of funding authorizations and budget requests.

3. Transfer Authority - Annual DoD Authorization and Appropriation Acts provide general authority (within a fiscal limitation) for transfers between appropriations based on unforeseen military requirements determined to be of higher priority than those initially authorized and appropriated.

4. Section 3732 Deficiency Authority - Permits the Department of Defense to enter into obligations on a deficiency basis to cover necessities of the current year under circumstances in which appropriations for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical supplies are exhausted.

5. Emergency Military Construction Authority - There are several provisions for this authority: 10 U.S.C. 2803, 10 U.S.C. 2804 and 10 U.S.C. 2808. The last authority is the-most relevant as it provides construction authority (within a fiscal limitation) in the event of war or presidential declaration of a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act requiring use of the Armed Forces. Under this provision, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other provision of law, may undertake military construction projects and authorize the Secretaries of the Military Departments to do the same.

#### D. Accelerate and/or Expand Industrial Production

Substantial increases in the production of weapons systems, equipment, medical materiel, munitions, and spares and repair parts are essential to sustaining deployed military forces in any armed conflict. In addition, actions to enhance capabilities for rapidly increasing U.S. industrial production can serve as a deterrent to armed conflict.

Substantial lag times exist between industrial production decisions and military materiel rolling off of assembly lines. Thus, industrial production decisions must be decided very early in a "crisis" situation.

Industrial surge and/or mobilization decisions fall into two basic categories: accelerate production rates and expand production capacity. Although described separately below, the course(s) of action considered in a particular situation may involve elements of both categories. For example, a decision that we need to accelerate the production rate of an item may be beyond the capacity of the facility where it is manufactured. Therefore, a production acceleration decision also could necessitate a decision to expand production capacity.

## 1. Accelerate Production:

There are two elements of any production acceleration decision: The first element is to decide which items are to be included in the decision. This requires that the substance of intended actions be clearly understood by all parties involved with formulating the option(s) and/or making the decision. Objectives of a production acceleration decision may be to:

- Send a visible strategic message to U.S. allies and potential adversaries.
- Enhance future industrial capacity to produce military materiel.
- Increase inventories of war reserve materiel.

The second element is to determine under which conditions the production acceleration is to take place. Basically, the choices are:

- Use routine, peacetime procurement and contract administration procedures. This is least disruptive to the economy; but also least "visible" by U.S. allies and potential adversaries.
- Vigorous implementation of the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS). This means that the Department of Defense, under authority delegated from the Department of Commerce (DoC), can mandate priority performance of certain contracts. However, this will "speed things up" only for items that are competing with commercial orders for industrial resources.

The preceding does not represent a one-time decision during the course of a crisis. Continued heightening of tension should result in the consideration of additional options to expand the number of items involved, further increase the desired production rates, and alter the conditions under which the production acceleration is taking place.

All of the preceding can be done without a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency. Conversely, the extent to which the Department of Defense may accelerate production without a supplemental appropriation from Congress depends on the availability of unobligated funds that can be reprogrammed. In order to convince the Congress that a supplemental appropriation should be enacted, the President may have to declare a national emergency.

## 2. Expand Production Capacity:

There are a number of actions that the Department of Defense could take individually, *or* in combination, in a "crisis" situation without a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency, to expand production capacity. These include:

- Procuring special tooling and test equipment and/or long leadtime components.
- Qualifying additional firms, not previously engaged in DoD production, to manufacture critical items.

- Activating standby plant equipment packages (PEPs) located in contractor facilities.
- Providing reserve industrial plant equipment controlled by the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC) to contractors.
- Activating laid-away production facilities.

Many of these possible actions could require reprogramming funds or seeking a supplemental appropriation.

Additionally, there are actions which require a Presidential determination of national defense essentiality; but not a Presidential Declaration of a National Emergency. These include:

- Activating voluntary agreements established pursuant to Title VII of the Defense Production Act.
- Activating the Machine Tool Trigger Order Program.
- Providing specific incentives to create or expand capacity or develop technological processes, pursuant to Title III of the Defense Production Act.

However, the latter two actions may require a supplemental appropriation.

The production capacity of some, if not many, facilities that manufacture defense materiel is constrained below the physical capacity of the facilities by environmental regulations. There is no statutory authority for a blanket waiver of these regulations even in the event of a congressional Declaration of National Emergency. Thus, one decision option that may need to be considered during a "crisis" situation is the submission of an enabling legislative proposal. On the other hand, site-specific waivers can be granted by Executive Order without a Presidential Declaration of a National Emergency.

#### E. Expand Military Manpower Supply

1. In time of war or national emergency, it will be necessary to increase substantially the supply of manpower to the Armed Forces. Although immediate increases in, manpower for the active forces could be achieved through recall of reservists and retirees to active duty and through augmentation of the five armed services with non-DoD resources, additional steps would need to be taken to ensure that adequate supply of manpower would be available to replace combat casualties, sustain the increased tempo of operations, and expand the force structure, if that became necessary.

2. The steps that may increase manpower supply during or preceding mobilization are broad categories that would do the following:

- a. Achieve an immediate increase in trained manpower.
- b. Increase the supply of untrained manpower.

c. Increase the rate at which training could be accomplished for those personnel requiring it.

§sub E.3. through E.6., below, describe those actions within each of these categories that could be taken to increase manpower supply:

### 3. Retiree Recall

Service Secretaries have the authority to recall military retirees who have completed 20 years of active duty service to active duty at any time in the interest of national defense. All retirees called back to active duty count against manpower ceilings, therefore, authorization to exceed end strength may be required. The retiree recall program will reduce the manpower shortfall by:

- a. Providing pretrained manpower.
- b. Freeing active component personnel for reassignment and/or deployment.
- c. Providing Continental United States (CONUS) base sustainment during the early days of mobilization.

Reserve retirees (who have not served 20 years of active duty) can be recalled to active duty only after congressional declaration of war and/or national emergency with the Secretary of Defense concurrence and the Service Secretary's determination that there are not enough qualified reserves in an active status or in the inactive National Guard.

### 4. Increases in Trained Manpower

a. Pretrained Individual Manpower (PIM). Upon mobilization, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), military personnel who retired after 20 years of active duty, and volunteer veterans may be used to increase the available supply of trained manpower. The IRR consists of individuals most of whom are trained and who have served previously in active forces or in the Selected Reserve. Most IRR members have some period of their Military Service obligation remaining. Retired military personnel are a resource of trained individuals that may be used to augment support and training facilities, to relieve Active Component or Ready Reserve members for other duties, or to accomplish operational missions as needed. Volunteer veterans with sufficient prior service and training may be employed without undergoing additional training.

b. Extension of Terms of Service (Stop-Loss). Each month a large number of trained military personnel leave the Service via retirement, resignation, discharge and separation. Eliminating this loss during periods of crisis has a stabilizing effect on the total force and enhances Service capabilities. Under the terms of 10 U.S.C. 673c, the President has the authority to suspend any provision of law related to promotion, separation, and retirement when it is essential to the national security of the United States.

c. Stop-loss actions include denial of voluntary retirement requests, denial of officer resignations and requests for relief from active duty, and extension of terms of service for enlisted and officer personnel. In addition, policies and procedures for curtailing administrative discharge of marginal performers could be adopted.

## 5. Increases in Untrained Manpower

a. Call Delayed Entry Program (DEP). Men and women, age 17 or older, may enlist in the active force DEP, and thereby become obligated to serve, but may delay entry to active duty for up to 12 months. The DEP allows many enlistees to complete high school before entering active duty and enables the Services to schedule the arrival of enlistees to coincide with the availability of space in Service training schools. Over 80 percent of all active force nonprior service enlistees enter active duty via the DEP. The average delay between enlistment in the program and entry on active duty is 2 to 3 months. In the event a national emergency is declared, early call of DEP enlistees to active duty would make a large number of persons available for immediate training.

b. During time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress, all DEP enlistees could be called to active duty prior to their scheduled entry dates. The Secretaries of the Military Departments would be authorized to determine the number and characteristics of DEP enlistees to be called, including whether women DEP enlistees were to be included in the call. It is OSD policy that members of DEP currently in high school will not be called.

c. Begin Conscription. Conscription would significantly increase the supply of untrained manpower to the Services in a relatively short period of time. Eighty four thousand six hundred inductees will be delivered to the Services within 30 days after the Selective Service System was directed to begin inductions. Although registration is now conducted under authority of the Military Selective Service Act, Section 17(c) of the Act would require repeal in order to restore induction authority.

## 6. Increase Training Rate

a. Acceleration of Officer Procurement Training. The Service Academies constitute the primary source of new officers for the Regular Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force; Platoon Leaders Class (PLC), for the Marine Corps. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at colleges and universities is an important source of officers for the Active and Reserve Components. During time of war or national emergency, the courses of instruction in the Service Academies, PLC, and ROTC could be accelerated in order to increase the supply of officers.

b. The length of the course of instruction at the Military, Naval, Coast Guard, and Air Force Academies is now set by law at 4 years. If required, this legislation could be amended to permit graduation and commissioning of cadets after their third year of study. Once the amendment was enacted, the current senior classes of cadets would be immediately commissioned, and each succeeding class of cadets would be graduated at the completion of their junior year, roughly doubling the number of cadets to be commissioned within 1 year of the amendment's enactment, and shortening the length of training for succeeding classes by 25 percent.

c. Cadets in the Senior ROTC program (college students in their junior and senior years) have substantially completed their military training after attending summer camp at the end of their junior year. Senior ROTC cadets are reservists, and could be ordered to active duty under the President's recall authority. Recalling those cadets to active duty would allow immediate commissioning of those cadets who have completed summer camp. The remainder could be immediately assigned to Officer Candidate School (OCS) or Officer Training School (OTS).

d. Expansion of Training Base Capacity. The Services currently train recruits at 16 active training centers. On mobilization, a large number of personnel (in the form of conscripts, volunteers, Delayed Entry Program (DEP) enlistees, untrained enlistees, and partially trained IRR members) would be added to the training base. The six training centers operated by the Air Force, Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps would be able to accommodate mobilization manpower training requirements within their current training base capability. The Army, however, would require major expansion of its training base and activation of additional recruit training facilities to absorb the additional trainees generated during mobilization.

e. Reserve Recall. The "Total Force" policy of the Department of Defense considers the U.S. Active, Guard, and Reserve forces as one integrated entity with complementary roles. Reserve component units provide additional combat power to augment the Active Forces in wartime, and are heavily relied upon for required support units since peacetime force levels cannot and need not support a wartime combat support structure.

f. The President may authorize recall to active duty up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days, plus an additional 90 days, without declaring a national emergency. (10 U.S. C. 673b. )

g. When the President declares a national emergency because of potential hostilities, he may order units and individuals of the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 24 months. However, no more than one million members of the Ready Reserve of all the Services may be on involuntary active duty at the same time without the consent of Congress. (10 U.S.C. 673(a) and (c).)

h. Only Congress can fully mobilize all Reserve forces and then only upon a congressional declaration of war or national emergency. All units and individuals of the Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserves may be ordered to active duty.

#### F. Augment Transportation Resources

Transportation is critical to the success of the Nation in nearly all military contingencies, since it will be necessary to deploy people and material to both reinforce and sustain military operations. The Department of Defense will be heavily dependent on transportation resources provided by the civilian sector, especially during the initial, rapid buildup.

Airlift Augmentation:

The Military Airlift Command (MAC) operates active component airlift squadrons that are immediately available in all situations, plus Reserve component squadrons that can be made available via the Presidential Selected Reserve call-up authority. The airlift capability inherent in MAC's active and/or Reserve component units can be incrementally augmented, based on ascending levels of DoD requirements, through the following programs:

Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The CRAF program is a civil and/or military partnership in which the civil air carrier industry commits airlift resources to the Department of Defense in time of emergency. The basic authority for CRAF is contained in E.O. 11490, which provides for the allocation of Civil airlift resources to the Department of Defense in time of an emergency. CRAF may be incrementally activated in stages to meet ascending levels of DoD requirements.

1. Stage I consists of aircraft that are committed by contract to a call-up by CINC, Military Airlift Command (MAC). This stage is sized to provide maximum DoD augmentation while permitting the civil airlines to continue normal, peacetime operations.

2. Stage II provides aircraft augmentation in situations short of a declared national emergency. This stage can be activated by the Secretary of Defense.

3. Stage III may be activated by order of the Secretary of Defense in the event of a defense-oriented national emergency declared by the President. Stage III can also be activated, in a situation short of a declared national emergency, by the Secretary of Defense, if a Presidential determination of national defense essentiality has been made.

When CRAF is activated, the crews and aircraft are under the mission control of MAC and function as a part of the total MAC airlift force.

NATO Civil Aircraft Fleet. The NATO nations have agreed to commit a specific number of civil aircraft in a NATO defense emergency or war. These aircraft would become available for U.S. use when the North Atlantic Council requests reinforcements.

War Air Service Program (WASP). DoT's War Air Service Program provides for the distribution and redistribution of air carrier aircraft to maintain essential civil routes after CRAF aircraft have been withdrawn. WASP can be implemented by the Secretary of Transportation in the event of a Presidential determination of national defense essentiality or a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency. Thus, during periods of crisis, tension or war, DoT, at the request of the Department of Defense, may allocate additional air carrier aircraft to the Department of Defense from the WASP.



Sealift Augmentation:

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled fleet consists of on hand assets that are immediately available in all situations. The MSC-controlled fleet is composed of chartered and government-owned vessels that are operated by Civil Service mariners or contractors. They are used to meet peacetime DoD cargo movement requirements and have a limited surge capability. The sealift capability inherent in the MSC-controlled fleet can be incrementally augmented, based on ascending levels of DoD requirements, through the following programs:

Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). The RRF consists of U.S.-owned cargo ships and tankers which can be activated within 5 to 20 days to meet surge shipping requirements.

Sealift Readiness Program (SRP). The SRP provides a means whereby MSC sealift capability can be augmented by U.S. flag ships in a timely manner. SRP is a standby contractual arrangement between MSC and private ship operators for provision of ships under charter for defense use.

The RRF and the SRP can be activated without a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency.

Requisitioning. The Secretary of Transportation, upon the request of the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to requisition U.S. flag and EUSC ships, whenever the President proclaims a defense-oriented national emergency, or upon a Presidential determination that the security of the national defense makes such an action advisable. The Effective U.S. Controlled (EUSC) ships are U.S.-owned ships of foreign registry.

National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF). The NDRF consists of inactive merchant ships and former Navy ships owned by the Government and maintained by MARAD in "wet storage." When the President proclaims a defense-oriented national emergency, NDRF ships may be activated, and placed in operational condition within 60 days.

NATO Ships. In a NATO defense emergency or war, the NATO-member governments have pledged to provide at least 400 ships to supplement the U.S. flag fleet. These ships would become available to the United States when the North Atlantic Council requests reinforcements.

CONUS Transportation Allocation:

The Department of Defense obtains nearly all of its CONUS transportation (e.g. rail, road, air, barge and ports) support through the civil sector in peacetime, and would also do so in a mobilization. However, unlike strategic airlift and sealift, domestic transportation is not comprised of discrete sets of assets that would transfer to DoD control. On the other hand, as with airlift and sealift, the allocation of domestic transportation resources for DoD use can be incrementally increased, based on ascending levels of DoD requirements. The Secretary of Transportation can implement priorities and allocations

of domestic transportation in the event of a Presidential determination of national defense essentiality or a Presidential Declaration of a National Emergency.

The USTRANSCOM Contingency Response Program (CORE) is designed to provide, through quick reaction procedures, DoD priority for commercial transportation prior to, and during, contingencies and mobilization. A key element of the CORE program is the CORE Team which gathers together senior decision makers from the Department of Defense, other Federal Agencies, and the Transportation industry. A DoD-DoT Procedural Arrangement has been established to assist the Department of Defense in meeting its requirements.

The CINCTRANSCOM can activate the CORE and assemble the team members in situations short of a declared national emergency. Upon receipt of an Execute Order, or the existence of a state of emergency, CORE team members can take immediate action to resolve transportation shortfalls affecting deployments or contingencies. USTRANSCOM requests, through JCS and OSD, priority service for DoD requirements from DoT. DoT authorizes the issuance of priority Service Orders to carriers directing that the Department of Defense be given priority

#### G. Expand Construction

1. In the event of a mobilization, additional facilities at DoD installations may be required to support production acceleration and expansion, to quarter additional trainees and mobilizing units, and to eliminate chokepoints in transportation.

2. Prior to a declaration of national emergency, two options can be used to undertake military construction (MILCON) under existing legislative authorization. However, both options preclude construction until either

a. Twenty-one days after notification to the appropriate committees of Congress *or*

b. Their approval of the projects.

c. The first option, 10 U.S.C. 2803 (Emergency Construction), authorizes the Secretaries of the Military Departments to execute projects within the unobligated balance of funds appropriated to the Military Departments for projects vital to the national security. The second option, 10 U.S.C. 2804 (Contingency Construction), authorizes the Secretary of Defense to execute projects upon Secretary of Defense determination that the deferral of the projects would be inconsistent with the national security.

3. In the event of a Congressional Declaration of War or a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency that requires use of the Armed Forces, the Department of Defense can undertake requisite construction projects without specific legislative authorization. However, the totality of such projects must be executable within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military construction (including unobligated family housing funds).

4. Immediately following notification of Partial Mobilization or Declaration of War or National Emergency, the adequacy of the MILCON Program to provide needed facilities will be reviewed. A supplemental appropriation for construction shortfalls should be requested.

5. Thus, there are four types of potential decisions concerning construction, that could confront the Secretary of Defense. The first deals with a determination of which projects (irrespective of Service) should be initiated within the unobligated balances of all the Military Departments. The second allows the use of the contingency construction authority to approve and fund emergency projects prior to partial mobilization. The third option would be construction program changes following Declaration of War or a National Emergency. The fourth deals with whether a supplemental appropriation for construction should be requested and, if so, which projects should be included.

#### H. Redistribute Materiel

In a period of rising tension that portends a mobilization, decisions by the Secretary of Defense (or the President) concerning military materiel could be required. These potential decisions fall into two categories -- actions to increase the availability of materiel, and allocations of available materiel.

##### 1. Materiel Availability:

The most obvious course of action to increase materiel availability is to accelerate production rates. Alternatives relative to this course of action are presented in the description of "Industrial Production" decision options.

The salient drawback to accelerating production is that lengthy leadtimes are required before substantial increases in available materiel occur. However, the United States may wish to respond to world events by rapidly increasing the availability of weapons systems, other major items of equipment, or war reserve secondary items, to one or more theater CINCs.

At any point in time, portions of DoD inventory of ships, aircraft, combat vehicles, C3 equipment, missiles, and exchangeable components (e.g., aircraft engines) are located at depot maintenance facilities undergoing or awaiting scheduled overhaul and repair. Thus, one--admittedly limited--means of increasing the availability of military materiel is to accelerate the output of the depot maintenance system.

As with mobilization decisions to accelerate industrial production, any proposals to accelerate depot maintenance must consider what items would be included. Such a determination must be based on the situation at hand, and the desired objectives of such a course of action.

Acceleration of depot maintenance does not require a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency, nor a decision by the Secretary of Defense. However, if the President has not exercised his Selected Reserve call-up authority, a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency would be required

to enable the Department of Defense to utilize the emergency civilian personnel management and hiring procedures necessary to rapidly accelerate depot maintenance. Furthermore, the extent to which the Department of Defense can accelerate depot maintenance without a supplemental appropriation from Congress depends upon the availability of unobligated funds that can be reprogrammed. In order to convince the Congress that a supplemental appropriation should be enacted, the President may have to declare a national emergency.

## 2. Materiel Allocation:

The inventory of War Reserve Stocks (WRS) for most items is now, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, insufficient to support combat operations in a major conflict until the production rate for the mobilized industrial base at least matches the attrition and/or consumption rate. Thus, unless acceleration of industrial production has commenced well in advance of the initiation of hostilities, "hard" materiel allocation decisions will have to be made, perhaps immediately, after a "crisis" commences. Potential materiel allocation decisions are as follows:

### a. Allocation Among U.S. Claimants

Materiel allocation actions fall into two generic groupings:

(1) Allocation of wholesale-level stock--typically stored at CONUS depots.

(2) Allocation of retail-level stocks--which are stored in warehouse and/or magazines at major installations worldwide.

Deciding the allocation of wholesale stocks among U.S. claimants is a JCS responsibility which is executed via the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocations Board (JMPAB).

b. For many WRS items, the combination of prepositioned (i.e., retail) and CONUS-held stocks could be insufficient to support a particular theater CINC's requirements. Therefore, a drawdown of one CINC's in-theater WRS for transshipment to another theater of operations is a distinct possibility. Such an action could perturb U.S. allies in the region that would be losing stocks. Thus, the NCA would need to consider the international political implication, as well as the military merits, in the course of deciding upon such actions.

### c. Allocation Between the U.S. and Foreign Countries

The WRS posture for allied and friendly foreign countries is analogous to that of the United States. Thus, in a coalition warfare situation, requests for materiel support by at least some allied and/or foreign countries are a distinct possibility. Consequently, the need to consider allocating materiel to foreign country forces vis-a-vis our own forces is likely to be unavoidable. Deciding to give materiel that is critical to continuation of a conflict-at-hand to a foreign country instead of our own forces--or vice versa--has far reaching politico-military implications that the NCA must address. On the other hand, the impact on DoD's logistics system is the same regardless.

d. Allocation Among Foreign Countries

The United States routinely provides peacetime materiel support from U.S. inventories to allied/friendly countries via the foreign military sales (FMS) program--the receipts from the FMS sales being used to finance the purchase of replenishment stocks. However, with the exception of the War Reserve Stocks--Allies (WRSA) program--which by DoD policy currently only applies to Korea, the Department of Defense is prohibited by law from procuring and holding stocks for eventual use by foreign countries.

e. Requests from allied and/or friendly foreign countries for "emergency" materiel support could occur either in a coalition warfare situation or as the result of a conflict involving the the Department of Defense country, but not the United States. Depending upon the items and quantity requested, the United States may not be able to accommodate such requests without degrading the readiness and/or combat sustainability of U.S. forces. Consequently, the NCA may need to consider the possibility of terminating (of at least diverting) materiel support to some (or all) of the foreign countries not engaged in the conflict-at-hand in order to satisfy requests for "emergency" support.

I. Expand Energy supply

In the event of a mobilization, and/or a petroleum supply disruption, the Department of Defense can take extraordinary actions to acquire additional energy resources to support DoD operations and defense-related industry. These actions are incremental in nature and based upon ascending levels of DoD and defense-related industry requirements.

Waiver of Procurement Restrictions. The Secretary of Defense is authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2404 to waive any provision of Federal acquisition statutes and regulations in order to expedite fuel procurements in a "tight" energy market. This authority can be used without a Presidential Declaration of National Emergency. However, this authority does not apply to obtaining energy resources for defense-related industry.

Drawdown Naval Petroleum Reserve (NPR). If needed to meet DoD petroleum product requirements, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics) may request the Director, Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves, Department of Energy (DOE) to transfer (with reimbursement) to the Department of Defense any portion of the U.S. Government's share of NPR authorized production. The Department of Defense would then offer this crude oil to refiners in exchange for petroleum products. This transfer is authorized under 10 U.S.C. 7430, as amended by the Energy Security Act (P.L. 96-294).

Drawdown Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). If not already underway, the Secretary of Defense can recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the necessary actions that would lead to a drawdown and competitive sale of the SPR and subsequently direct distribution to the Department of Defense of an amount up to 10 percent of the volume sold. The Department of Defense would then offer this crude oil to refiners in exchange for petroleum products. Drawdown of the SPR, however, is contingent upon a Presidential finding that such action is necessary to meet a "severe energy supply interruption or to fulfill obligations of the United States under the International Energy Program," as authorized under the "Energy Policy and Conservation Act," 42 U.S.C. 6241.

Invoke Defense Production Act (DPA). The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) (ASD(P&L)) can request the Assistant Secretary of Energy (International Affairs and Energy Emergencies) (ASE(IAEE)) to invoke the DPA, directing refiners with DoD contracts to meet DoD requirements on a priority basis and refiners that have no such contracts to accept new DoD contracts and cover minimum essential military petroleum product requirements stated therein on a priority basis. Crude oil that refiners have acquired from the SPR through competitive bidding is subject to these requirements, equally with other crude oils. Similarly, ASD(P&L) can request ASE(IAEE) to invoke the DPA and authorize DoD contractors to pass rated orders that regularly exist on defense materiel contracts to those subcontracts between defense industrial base suppliers and their utility and/or fuel suppliers, requiring them to meet defense industrial base energy requirements on a priority basis. These actions are authorized under section 101(a) of the DPA of 1950, as amended, and E.O.s 10480, 11790, and 12038.

Meeting International Oil Sharing Obligations. The International Energy Agency (IEA) and the NATO Wartime Oil Organization (NWO) administer emergency oil sharing agreements to which the United States is a signatory.

Under the International Energy Program (IEP) administered by the IEA, the U.S. is expected to conserve (e.g., up to 7 and then 10 percent of its energy consumption), rapidly draw down its petroleum stocks (e.g., SPR oil), and divert petroleum imports to the United States and/or export U.S.-produced petroleum to any country pursuant to the International Emergency Oil Sharing Plan of the IEA.

The NWO is the NATO Civil Wartime Agency concerned with resolving military and civilian petroleum shortages among member nations. The NWO is comprised of senior energy officials from government and industry in each participating nation whose responsibility it is to level out petroleum shortages during war-time through oil sharing. Depending on the situation, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe may request from the NWO petroleum supplies and/or distribution support to overcome petroleum logistics breakdowns in specific areas of the theater.

#### J. Expand Health Care Personnel Supply

There is at present an insufficient number of health professionals in the active and reserve forces to deliver the health care to military personnel which would be required during time of war or mobilization.

Service-specific shortages in particular skill areas could be temporarily reduced via cross-Service utilization of personnel (e.g., assignment of Navy surgeons to the Army). This action would not increase the total amount of health personnel available, but it would help reduce shortages in early deploying units. Recall of reserve health personnel and of retirees would provide immediate augmentation of the active force, although recall would not meet total health manpower requirements due to shortfalls in reserve unit manning. Retiree recall can be accomplished under appropriate authorities. A Presidential declaration of national emergency or 200K call-up would be required to recall reservists. Medical reservists in the IRR can be called to active duty only after a declaration of national emergency.

The commissioned officer corps of the Public Health Service (PHS) can also be transferred to the Department of Defense by order of the President in time of war or national emergency (42 U.S.C. 217). PHS, however, has not yet determined how many officers would be required for critical civilian health care during mobilization and, therefore, the number available for transfer to the Department of Defense.

It may be possible to obtain additional health personnel from the civilian health care system by intensifying recruiting efforts. With the cooperation of the American Medical Association (AMA) and other health groups, it may be possible to contact individuals with needed skills directly. Special pays could be offered to those with critically-needed skills as inducements to volunteer for either active or reserve duty.

If voluntary recruiting fails or the situation is so serious that time is not available to see if a volunteer program will work, it will be necessary to conscript health care personnel. There is currently no statutory authority to register, classify or induct health care personnel. Congress would have to enact such legislation before conscription could begin. To ensure that individuals with needed skills are obtained, conscription legislation should authorize registration, classification, and induction of health care personnel by specialty.

#### K. Transfer of Federal Agencies to Department of Defense Control

The Department of Defense, in time of war or national emergency, can increase its capabilities by initiating action through the President to transfer various functions and resources of the Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to the operational control of the Department of Defense. The decisions and objectives of these actions are:

1. To transfer the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation (DoT) to the Department of the Navy (DoN). Upon transfer, the Coast Guard continues to perform its statutory mission, reporting to the SECNAV, as well as its assigned wartime military missions. The transfer allows for the Coast Guard to be assigned additional national defense missions with the defense missions having the higher priority. For example, upon mobilization the Coast Guard will provide specific units to CINC OPLANS and the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ).
2. To transfer selected elements of the FAA to DoD control to ensure that FAA operations are consistent with essential national defense airlift requirements.
3. To transfer to the Department of Defense selected NOAA resources to augment the environmental services, mapping, charting, and geodetic capabilities of the Department of Defense.

The decisions to transfer elements to the Department of Defense can be accomplished in varying degrees, from partial reprioritization of missions and selected resources to total departmental transfer. Total transfer becomes important only when large forces are involved under rapidly changing conditions; those typified by full mobilization. Under less stringent conditions, it is believed that most military objectives could be achieved using the

current management structure. Reprioritization of missions and transfer of specific forces are essentially independent of departmental transfer. It is incumbent upon the Department of Defense to anticipate the need to assume operational control of these agencies without unduly disrupting the-existing organizational structure, or seriously curtailing essential civilian services.

#### Transfer Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to Navy

The Coast Guard is at all times one of the five armed services. For the purpose of mobilization planning it can be considered a military department under the Department of the Navy. It should be noted, however, that for certain contingencies or activation of the Maritime Defense Zone, Coast Guard forces may be chopped to the CINCs, even though mobilization has not occurred.

The Coast Guard has forces and resources that contribute significantly during contingencies and in time of war or national emergency to essential military activities both within and outside of the United States. Coast Guard forces are listed in many CINC OPLANS, CONPLANS, and in plans for the support of the Maritime Defense Zone. The MDZ plans provide for coastal and harbor defense of the United States, under Navy command.

As threats of terrorism and sabotage continue to increase, defense of strategic U.S. outload ports is a prime consideration in preconflict actions. The Coast Guard falls under recall authorities (200K call-up) and declaration of national emergencies (partial or full mobilization), regardless of whether the Coast Guard is under DoT or the Department of the Navy. Both DoT, and the Coast Guard should be kept advised of all mobilization actions, to provide required port security and coastal defense. Under most circumstances the Coast Guard will require increased *reserve* manpower to meet national defense requirements.

Transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy provides significant benefits in the command and control of coastal defense forces. It is important to note that during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, the entire Coast Guard was not transferred. Selected Coast Guard activities were transferred to the Navy. Therefore, transfer should be considered at each level during the transition from peacetime to full mobilization. Legal authority to transfer the Coast Guard, as a specialized service, to the Navy is found in 14 U.S.C. 3.

#### Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to the Department of Defense

Transferring FAA functions and resources to the Department of Defense is expected to ensure that defense-essential air traffic is accommodated to the maximum extent possible while simultaneously maintaining essential civil air traffic. This requires the establishment and regulation of aircraft operational priorities within the national air space. Congress has provided legislation to ensure priority for national defense, and to provide authority to transfer functions and elements of the FAA to the Department of Defense.

There are currently no easily defined conditions or planned schedules to determine which elements of the FAA should come under DoD control. Transfer of control may be incremental in nature from normal peacetime operations into a period where defense-essential air operations have priority and are being accommodated in an overall environment of increased air activity. The Department of Defense would seek control of elements of the FAA only as the need



arose and that control would likely be temporary and/or localized in nature.

#### Transfer National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) Assets to the Department of Defense

The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) is a major Federal Agency, constituting nearly 40 percent of the Department of Commerce's workforce. Its principal functions and activities of DoD interest include: preparing and issuing nautical and aeronautical charts, providing precise geodetic surveys in peacetime, predicting tides, currents and state of the oceans, providing satellite observation of the environment, and weather observation and forecasting.

It is unlikely that a decision to transfer a significant portion of NOAA assets to the Department of Defense would be recommended or sought. Instead, a more likely scenario would include an appropriate shift of emphasis in many of NOAA's activities from normal peacetime priorities to conditions where priority of support would be given to the Department of Defense. NOAA assets -- vessels, aircraft, etc. -- would be requested by the Department of Defense as specific needs develop; attendant NOAA commissioned officers and ancillary facilities would also be included. Transfers of NOAA vessels, aircraft, equipment, stations, and commissioned officers to the Department of Defense can be made only by Presidential Executive Order; transfers may be made to any Military Department.

#### L. Initiate Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Repatriation

Large numbers of U.S. citizens and their dependents live, work, and vacation in potential combat areas abroad. Many or all noncombatants could require evacuation from those areas in the event hostilities threaten. Depending upon the contingency, the number of persons requiring evacuation could be quite high. In the case of a European contingency--which would present a most demanding evacuation requirement--there are perhaps 800,000 to 1,300,000 (a number which varies seasonally) potential noncombatants, including tourists.

During a period of rising tensions, the initiation of evacuation operations would have a serious impact on both allied nations and potential adversaries. However, deferral of evacuation could have serious consequences in the event of actual hostilities. Actions not involving full-scale evacuation are available. Decisions are made by the NCA upon recommendation of the Secretary of State.

NEO includes activities pertaining to the actual collection and movement of evacuees from their overseas locations to CONUS or a designated safe haven area. Repatriation is the activity pertaining to the reception of evacuees in CONUS and their onward movement to final destinations. The following sections briefly describe Federal civilian agencies, and DoD's responsibilities for each of these categories of evacuation activities.

#### Evacuation of Noncombatants from Overseas

Department of State (DoS). Under E.O. 11490, the Secretary of State is responsible for all U.S. citizens overseas and for developing policies, plans, and procedures for protection or evacuation of American citizens and nationals and for safeguarding their property worldwide, with certain exceptions. The

Department of Defense and other agencies assist in evacuation planning.

Department of Defense. The primary role of the Department of Defense is to support DoS requests, when militarily feasible. Under E.O. 11490, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for advising and assisting DoS in planning for the evacuation of DoD dependents, U.S. teachers, administrators, and other U.S. citizens working abroad. In addition, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for developing plans for implementation of approved DoS and/or DoD policies and procedures for protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens abroad. By agreement (see DoD Directive 5100.51) with DoS, the Department of Defense has primary responsibility for protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens in West Berlin, and U.S. Naval Base, Guanta-name, and for DoD-sponsored noncombatants in the Federal Republic of *Germany* (FRG). (Evacuation plans for DoD noncombatants in the FRG must be integrated into DoS plans.)

Principal Diplomatic and Consular Officials. When hostilities occur with complete surprise or are so imminent that delay in initiation of evacuation would jeopardize persons for whose protection the Secretary of State is responsible, and the principal diplomatic officer is unable to consult with the Department of State, the senior diplomatic or consular official in the area may invoke that area's evacuation plan.

U.S. Military Commanders. Upon request of the principal diplomatic officer, U.S. military commanders are authorized to assist in the evacuation of U.S. citizens to the extent militarily feasible without prior JCS authorization in instances where delay would place U.S. citizens in jeopardy, and communications are nonexistent. When U.S. citizens are in danger, but the appropriate military commander cannot establish timely communications with U.S. diplomatic officials and cannot wait for prior JCS authorization, the military commander may initiate such action as he deems necessary, appropriate, and militarily feasible, with full cognizance of the diplomatic consequence that may ensue.

Washington and Regional Liaison Groups. To ensure interdepartmental coordination in evacuation planning and operations, the Secretaries of State and Defense have established the Washington Liaison Group (WLG). WLG is responsible for ensuring coordination at the Washington level of all noncombatant emergency and evacuation planning by the Department of Defense, the DoS, and by other U.S. Government Agencies, as appropriate. The WLG is also responsible for providing advice and guidance to, and for monitoring the activities of, regional liaison groups, which have been established to coordinate interagency evacuation planning in the field. The WLG is chaired by a DoS representative.

#### Reception of Evacuees in CONUS

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS is responsible for the reception, repatriation, and onward movement of all evacuees under emergency conditions. Under E.O. 11490, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is responsible for developing plans and procedures for assistance at ports of entry to U.S. personnel evacuated from overseas areas, for their onward movement to their final destination, and for the provision of follow-up assistance after their arrival at those destinations. DHHS coordinates national, regional, State, and local teams of Federal and non-Federal Agencies charged with developing and implementing operational plans for evacuee reception.

Department of the Army. Department of the Army, as designated executive agent for the Department of Defense, coordinates within the Department of Defense and with other Federal and local agencies in planning for the reception in CONUS and onward movement of U.S. Government employees and their dependents, U.S. Citizens, and selected aliens evacuated from overseas areas.

The Army has published the Joint Plan for DoD Noncombatant Repatriation for the expedited administrative return of DoD noncombatants to CONUS over a protracted period, under small scale, nonemergency conditions. The Plan specifies the use of DoD resources for reception activities.

## V. EXERCISES AND SIMULATIONS

A significant feature of any system or plan is the ability to evaluate and assess that plan under the most realistic conditions. It follows, then, that if the MMP is to be an accepted and credible document, the DoD Components must periodically examine their responsibilities and tasks defined in the MMP. Short of armed conflict, the closest the Department of Defense can come to simulating a crisis situation is through some form of exercise or simulation.

### Exercises

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsors several major command post exercises (CPXs) annually, emphasizing, various aspects of the defense operation--mobilization, deployment, sustainment, warfighting, etc. For each of these CPXS, a new scenario is developed, along with the corresponding objectives and assumptions. In most cases, its program is sufficiently broad enough in scope to accommodate the participation of all DoD Components. The exercises are designed to test procedures; ultimately they enhance the capability of participants to respond in varying *degrees* to a crisis, contingency, or general war environment. Although the Joint Staff is responsible for scheduling, planning, conducting, and evaluating the exercise, it is the responsibility of each participant (including OSD) to contribute appropriately in order to achieve maximum benefit.

The exercise program constitutes a vital link in DoD's mobilization planning process. Through the exercises, significant issues are evaluated, problems are identified and resolved, resolutions are used to modify and improve plans (i.e., the MMP), and the modifications are ultimately reexamined in a future exercise. Thus, by active participation in exercises, the MMP will remain a very active and current document for the Department of Defense.

### Simulations

Since the existing JCS program is cyclical in nature, each exercise has a specific purpose (with associated objectives and assumptions), and in some cases the scope is too narrow to include all DoD Components adequately. For example, in a crisis build-up environment, the Secretary of Defense would consider political issues and solutions as well as military solutions. The Secretary of Defense's efforts could be directed primarily to deterrence even though this option might not be incorporated (by design) in an exercise assessing force readiness or warfighting. In this circumstance, the Department of Defense must look for alternative methods to examine decision-making and crisis response procedures.